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Reconstructing The Wagner Act
Jean-Christian Vinel
1 To readers familiar with Nelson Lichtenstein’s  previous work,  State  of  the Union is  an
important book because it seems to be a milestone revealing a move away from the New
Left perspective established in Labor’s War at Home. Key to this perspective was the idea
that in the 1940s, unions had curbed workers’ militancy to bring them into the realm of
corporate order, thereby accommodating the needs of a capitalist state. Not so anymore:
the  promise  of  industrial  democracy  no  longer  seems  ambiguous,  for  Lichtenstein
rehabilitates both liberal policy makers and unions, showing that they collaborated in the
1930s to foster and establish citizenship on the workplace. A radical idea, the notion of
industrial democracy eroded over the 20th century—especially during the 1950s and 1960s
—because it was embattled, moderated and abandoned. The ambition of State of the Union
is to historicize this process—it is in many ways the history of the nullification of the
Wagner Act.
2 I’m thoroughly convinced by this reevaluation of the role of American liberals, although I
beg  to  disagree  with  the  terms  on  which  it  is  carried  out.  The  first  two  chapters,
“Reconstructing the 1930s” and “Citizenship at Work,” are critically important because
they restore the idea that the New Dealers revolutionized the lives of American workers,
and thus depict the objectives from which liberals subsequently strayed. Yet, in focusing
exclusively on the notion of industrial democracy, and in equating the Wagner Act with a
new definition of citizenship, these two chapters paint a somewhat optimistic picture of
the law, leaving its weaknesses in the background.
3 I would argue that the phrase “industrial democracy,” because it meant different things
to different people in the 1930s, is too vague to help us recapture the logic underlying the
drafting and adoption of  the Wagner Act.  As  we reconstruct  the reform wrought by
liberals, it is essential to distinguish between their objectives (industrial democracy) and
their methods. In this paper, I would like to focus on the ways and means of New Deal
liberalism, and highlight its inherent limits, which were most apparent in the failure of
the institution it created—namely, the National Labor Relations Board. In the end, I would
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like to suggest that there are lessons to learn from this failure, lessons that are relevant
to the current effort to rejuvenate American unions. 
4 I  will  first  review the salient  points of  Lichtenstein’s  analysis  of  the adoption of  the
Wagner  Act.  The  National  Labor  Relations  Act,  he  explains,  was  the  product  of  two
concurring liberal endeavors. The first one was to offset the underconsumption that was
deemed to have caused the Great Depression. For years overproduction and cutthroat
competition had stifled the American economy, both in “old” industries such as lumber
and in the consumer-oriented ones, such as the automobile sector, leaving many farmers
and workers in dire economic conditions. As a result, even as the economy grew in the
1920s, a large section of the population was left out and did not enjoy the benefits of
prosperity.  Hence, to liberals,  empowering unions was seen as a method of enforcing
minimum wage standards—an “American” standard of living (21-25). 
5 As Lichtenstein explains, however, “if the New Deal State and the newly vigorous trade
unions had only been successful as wage-fixing institutions designed to solve the problem
of  ‘underconsumption,’  their  appeal  would  have  been  diminished  considerably.”(30)
Indeed, liberals, workers and policymakers alike were at work redefining the very notion
of American citizenship both from the top down and from the bottom up. Along with an
American  standard  of  living,  the  liberals’  other  objective  was  to  democratize  the
American  workplace  to  put  an  end  to  “industrial  tyranny,”  by  giving  unions  legal
recognition as well as state protection. According to Wagner, the right to organize was
concomitant with the right to vote—there was to be industrial  democracy as well  as
political  democracy.  In  the  1930s,  Lichtenstein  argues,  the  right  to  organize became
“American.”(35)
6 Thus,  there  were  two  readings  of  the  Wagner  Act—an  economic  reading  and  a
philosophical one. These two readings, however, were scarcely compatible: for a group of
liberals, such as Frances Perkins, President Roosevelt, and reform-minded businessmen,
the right to organize was mostly a means to an end, there was nothing fundamental about
it—they saw it as one measure that could bring about a way out of the Depression. Indeed,
and  the  case  of  Franklin  Roosevelt  is  illustrative,  many  liberals  did  not  trust  labor
organizations,  and  did  not  want  to  strengthen  them. Notably,  there  were  no  labor
provisions in the first drafts of the NLRA bill.1 
7 Other  liberals,  however,  disagreed.  According  to  them,  the  right  to  organize  had
compelling philosophical justifications—it was a goal in and of itself. As Leon Keyserling—
the  drafter  of  the  Wagner  Act—once  remarked,  the  Act  was  based  on the  idea  that
“collective bargaining is an essential attribute of a free society.” To him, the Act was the
last  stage  in  the  workers’  journey  from  oppression  to  freedom.2 Senator  LaFollette
concurred, arguing that the Wagner Act had elevated the right to organize to a civil
liberty.3
8 Could  the  NLRA  move  simultaneously  in  two  different  directions?  It  seems  highly
unlikely. In his opening statement to Congress, Senator Wagner chose to emphasize the
economic, not the philosophical reading of the Wagner Act, explaining that cooperation
between employer  and  employee  was  key  to  achieving  recovery.4 The  report  of  the
Committee of Education and Labor, otherwise extremely supportive of the bill, sounded
no other theme, arguing that collective bargaining was necessary to improve workers’
wages and remedy the economic situation.5 The notion of citizenship was conspicuously
absent from the debates held in Congress.  From the beginning,  I’d like to argue,  the
economic reading of the Act prevailed over the philosophical one.6 
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9 Moreover, a close look at the Wagner Act shows the true nature of the revolution brought
about by the Act.  The act  stated that  it  was the public  policy of  the US to promote
industrial  peace  and  avert  strikes.  Hence  it  promoted  collective  bargaining  on  the
grounds that such protection would enhance the economy. The Act did make a passing
reference to freedom of association, but it protected no substantive right. The right to
organize  was  subservient  to  a  public  policy—sustaining  consumption  and  preserving
industrial peace. Interestingly, in 1938, in the aftermath of the constitutional crisis of the
1930s, the Supreme Court announced that from now on, it would differentiate between
laws regulating the economy and laws affecting fundamental rights—the latter would be
submitted to heightened judicial scrutiny. Tellingly, however, it did not list the right to
organize as a fundamental right.7 The Wagner Act, in other words, promoted not a civil
right,  but  rather  what  I  would  call  a  “public  right”—a  right  whose  philosophical
underpinnings were not as strong as its economic ones. 
10 Indeed, the act neither applied to citizens nor to workers, but to “employees”—a term that
is  taken for  granted in  this  part  of  the  book.  Yet,  an economic—not  philosophical—
concept, the term “employee” reminds us of Pierre Bourdieu’s admonition that historians
must pay close attention to “performative speeches,” which are a way to shape social
reality.8 A foreign import, the term “employee” entered mainstream American English in
the post-civil war era at a time when American businessmen were busy trying to ward off
the  development  of  national  unions,  and  when  the  Courts  were  developing  a
jurisprudence based on liberty of contract. Later, the term found much purchase in the
welfare capitalism programs of John D. Rockefeller and others.9 All along, the use of the
term “employee” was part of an attempt to convince workers that their interests were
the same as those of their “employers”—its use amounting to a negation of class rhetoric.
To be sure, Wagner and his aides probably defined it differently, but both the history of
the term “employee” and the fact that its closest synonym in the law was not worker, but
wage earner alerts us to the economic objectives pursued by the law. 
11 Thus, notwithstanding the ubiquitous deployment of the industrial democracy rhetoric in
the 1930s, the empowerment of the “employees” was not akin to a real democratization
of the workplace. In no way did the law acknowledge the social stratification of American
society. The class struggle was treated more as an economic pathology than as a social
and political reality warranting a reconstruction of American democracy.
12 More importantly, the vision of industrial democracy promoted by the Wagner Act stood
in  sharp contrast  to  earlier  definitions  and visions  of  the  right  to  organize.  Samuel
Gompers,  for  example,  argued  in  his  autobiography  that  the  ever-larger  number  of
injunctions  issued  against  the  AFL  were  unconstitutional  because  they  deprived  the
workers of their constitutional rights as citizens.10 And, as we have learned from the
scholarship of William Forbath and James Gray Pope, early in the 20th century the AFL
tried to use the 13th amendment and the 1 st amendment to develop a  constitutional
argument securing the legitimacy of unions.11 Yet the AFL’s constitutional reading of the
right to organize was never endorsed. Not only did it run afoul of the progressive belief
that  laws should benefit  the  public  interest,  and not  a  special  class,  but  it  was  also
opposed by liberal reformers, who believed that the AFL’s voluntarism was no solution to
industrial disputes, and crafted alternative and competing institutional schemes. In the
1930s, those reformers were able to impose their vision of reform, a vision predicated on
a denial of the constitutional dreams of the AFL.12 
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13 Now, I’m not trying to argue that  the 1930s were not turbulent years full  of  radical
possibilities. Nor am I trying to defend the conservative interpretation of the New Deal
that you rightfully lay to rest in State of the Union. Rather I’d like to suggest that we need
to understand how New Deal liberals could simultaneously reject the constitutional right
to organize for which the AFL had been calling for and believe they had achieved both
moral and political victory with the Wagner Act.13 To do that, we must also look at the 30s
and 40s from a state-oriented perspective, and emphasize the role of actors that remain
in the background in State of the Union—legal reformers and the NLRB. 
14 The significance of the passage of the Wagner Act lay as much in the growth of the
administrative powers of the Federal State as in its protection of the right to organize. To
be  sure,  it  afforded unprecedented protection to  unions  and empowered millions  of
workers in the workplace. Yet the true revolution of the law was its new reading of the
commerce  clause  of  the  Constitution,  which  enabled  the  Federal  State  to  promote
collective  bargaining,  and to  set  up an administrative  agency,  namely,  the  NLRB,  to
administer that policy.14 The members of the NLRB were to be at once the judges, the
prosecutors and the legislators of the common law of labor.
15 Notably,  the  creation  of  the  NLRB  was  an  important  milestone  in  the  history  of
delegation,  that is,  the idea that the powers of  the executive,  the legislative and the
judiciary could be concentrated in one independent agency for the sake of efficiency.15 Its
members were granted the power to determine the size of bargaining units, and enforce
the unfair labor practices clauses of the Act, which, ipso facto, meant that they could
directly influence the strength and cohesiveness of the labor movement. 
16 The NLRB was therefore the State’s visible hand on labor relations. It was a Progressive
institution  whose  forebears  were  not  the  industrial  commissions  pioneered  by  the
industrial  pluralists  earlier  in the century,  but  rather the ICC and the Federal  Trade
Commission. Underlying its creation was a political theory that harkened back to the
political thought of progressives such as Herbert Croly, Frank J. Goodnow, and Woodrow
Wilson, who early in the century, had argued that independent agencies were the best
way  to  further  the  public  interest.  Staffed  with  virtuous  and  disinterested  experts
insulated from political  pressure,  such agencies would devise scientific  and impartial
policies to deal with the social and economic problems confronting the nation.16 Thus, the
American state would overcome the limitations imposed by the separation of powers.
Popularized by James Landis’s The Administrative Process in 1938, this theory was revived
in the 1930s, by the New Dealers, who believed it afforded the only way to deal with the
flaws of the free market.17 As Landis explained, “The administrative process is, in essence,
our generation’s answer to the inadequacy of the judicial and legislative processes.”18 
17 Key to understanding the emergence and preeminence of the delegation doctrine was the
full  participation  of  legal  realists  in  the  shaping  of  New Deal  liberalism.  Like  many
advocates of regulation (Louis Jaffe, Thurman Arnold, Jerome Frank, etc.) James Landis
was a lawyer who had accepted the basic tenets of legal realism, that is, the idea that the
purpose of the law’s objectives should be to bring about just social results, not adhere to
abstract principles. While they sought to introduce the use of social science in law, the
realists saw the courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, as an obstacle to
social  reform  in  the  1920s  and  1930s.  Hence  they  favored  the  development  of
administrative law through the creation of regulatory agencies. Equally important, the
realists largely inspired themselves from the work of Thorstein Veblen and his calls for a
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technocratic  management  of  society.  In  the  words  of  Roscoe  Pound,  the  realists’
intellectual father, lawyers should become “social engineers.”19
18 The role of the legal realists in the shaping of the New Deal was not simply intellectual,
but also logistical. Throughout the New Deal, Felix Frankfurter, the head of the wartime
NWPB, and one of the closest advisers of President Roosevelt, channeled many young
lawyers  from  Harvard  and  other  elite  institutions  to  Washington.20 Thus,  the
reemergence of the regulation theory was also the product of a quest for authority—the
quest of lawyers who sought to recast themselves as disinterested and impartial public
servants. 
19 The creation of  the NLRB was in many respects the product of  this  quest  for a new
institutional order. Legal realists had long considered collective bargaining to be a major
public interest.21 The Wagner Act was drafted by three lawyers, Leon Keyserling Thomas
Emerson, and Philip Levy, with the help of Milton Handler and Clavert Magruder—two
well-known advocates of legal realism.22 Keyserling—the main drafter—was a particularly
important figure. An economist who had studied with Rexford Tugwell at Columbia (one
of the seedbeds of legal realism), Keyserling had been involved in the drafting of the
NLRA, and had and pushed for and drawn up section 7a. To him, the protection of the
right to organize was a compelling public imperative, because it was the only alternative
to  industrial  chaos  or  a  fully  government-administered  economy.23 Above  all,  he
understood that it was important to emphasize the public’s interest, and not labor’s, for
the  law to  be  declared  constitutional.  Throughout  the  drafting  process,  the  lawyers
resisted Frances Perkins’s attempts to create a mediation agency located in the labor
department, and also refused to put the Courts in charge of the enforcement of the law.
Rather,  they  used  the  Federal  Trade  Commission  as  a  model  to  make  the  NLRB  an
independent, quasi-judicial agency. 
20 Thus, as we reconstruct the Wagner Act, the true ways and means of this political project
become  clear.  True,  the  law’s  objective  was  to  operate  an  important  change  in  the
relations of power in American society. But in my view, no new definition of citizenship
was  involved  in  this  legislative  effort.  Rather,  the  law  resorted  to  regulation  and
disinterested expertise to change society in the name of the public interest. The adoption
in 1947 of the Taft-Hartley Act showed that this attempt was a failure. 
21 If one were to find a phrase to capture the essence of the NLRB’s work from 1936 to 1947,
none would be more appropriate than affirmative action. Not only was that phrase coined
and included in the language of the Wagner Act, but the NLRB actively sought to put an
end to the anti-union practices of employers and their effects.24 This vigorous promotion
of industrial unionism included classifying as “employees” as many classes of workers as
possible  (foremen,  plant  protection  employees,  agricultural  workers)  and  devising
specific rules to curb employer’s interference with the law.25 
22 While  its  enforcement  of  the  law  was  successful,  the  NLRB  failed  to  establish  the
legitimacy of its work, and the legitimacy of the regulation of labor relations as a whole.
Indeed, by the end of the 1940s the NLRB was derided as a biased agency that exemplified
the economic problems facing the nation.  Labor unions had become too strong,  and
needed to be checked just like the agency that defended them. Most important of all,
conservatives  were  not  alone  in  voicing  this  criticism;  liberals  ranging  from Walter
Lippman to President Truman also joined the chorus. 
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23 Not surprisingly, this criticism was given a legislative transformation in the Taft Hartley
Act. Not only did the act restrain the right to organize, but, as Lichtenstein remarks, it
deprived supervisors of protection of the law, thereby denying both the impartiality of
the  NLRB  and  its  vision  of  the  public  good.  Finally,  in  a  severe  blow,  Taft-Hartley
separated its judicial from investigative procedures by making the General Counsel and
independent  actor,  thus  making  it  much more  difficult  for  the  agency  to  develop  a
coherent policy. NLRB members protested—to no avail—that the agency was no different
from other regulatory agencies, and could not do its work properly with an independent
General Counsel.  In many ways, the Taft Hartley law marked an important departure
from the delegation doctrine of the 1930s. 
24 How can we account for this failure? In the end, I would argue, the Wagner Act worked
well, indeed too well for its own good. The NLRB simply delivered what the Wagner Act
implied—a redefinition of the power structure of American society. True, the Act sought
to foster industrial peace, but such a peace, as Senator Wagner explained, could only
come when the right to organize was fully respected.26 The problem, however, was that in
the realm of labor relations, things did not play out according the scheme envisioned by
the New Dealers.  Let us remember that according to James Landis,  regulation was an
activity  conducted by experts  insulated from political  controversies,  working for  the
public  good.  The  controversy  that  attended  the  NLRB’s  definition  of  foremen  as
employees under the law, its decisions regulating employer behavior, the excessive power
of unions in general shows that the NLRB never acquired this authority—in the area of
labor relations, the delegation theory simply broke down in the 1940s. 
25 First  and foremost,  contrary to  what  Landis  and other  proponents  of  the delegation
doctrine expected,  devising an “impartial” policy in the realm of labor relations is  a
quixotic  quest.  In  the  1940s  the  decisions  protecting  the  right  to  organize  did  not
alleviate class conflict; rather, they nourished it and reinforced it. Second, there is no
easily definable, lasting definition of what the “public interest” is. While in the 1930s
liberals mostly sought to foster consumption, at the end of the war their main concern
was  to  sustain  production  and  employment,  which  led  them  to  lend  much  more
importance to industrial peace than they had previously done.27 Overall, because it was
defined in political and economic terms from the start, the notion of “public interest”
proved incompatible with the goal of allowing an independent agency to craft a lasting
common law for labor. 
26 Finally, the NLRB lacked legitimacy because of the language on which it relied. In an
attempt to be a close as possible to judicial adjudication, the agency relied on a legal
discourse in its proceedings and organization. In spite of the preeminence of the notion
of the “rule of law” in America, however, this legal discourse jeopardized its authority
because the NLRB had no monopoly on it. Its every decision was analyzed and dissected
by supporters and dissenters alike. In an ironic twist of history, the agency became even
weaker institutionally than the Courts it was supposed to supplement.
27 Thus, in the 19430s and 40s, the main process at work in labor relations was a process of
politicization  of  labor  expertise  and  regulation.  This  politicization  was  evident  in
Roosevelt’s decision to name a businessman from Kansas —John M. Houston—to the NLRB
in 1943, in the legal battles that pitted union lawyers against those of corporations, and in
the many calls for a revision of the law. Far from being the place of consensus that James
Landis had envisioned, the NLRB became a place of conflict—a conflict that in the end the
NLRB was too weak to manage. 
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28 In many ways, New Deal liberals were the victims of what Louis Jaffe—one of the leading
advocates  of  administrative  agencies—was  to  call  the  “illusion  of  the  ideal
administration.”28 The NLRB failed for one reason—its work, indeed, its very existence,
was not the product of a strong social contract. Significantly, upon the creation of the
EEOC twenty years later, the liberals had this “place of conflict” in mind, and they used
the NLRB as a counter-model, limiting the new agency to investigatory powers.29 
29 By way of conclusion, I’d like to make two related points. The first one is historical. I fully
agree  that  the  liberals,  who  pushed  for  the  adoption  of  the  Wagner  Act,  should  be
rehabilitated because theirs was indeed a radical idea that could have altered the very
social structure of American society. Yet, there was an inherent weakness in their project.
Although it was not apparent to many actors, by the late 1940s they had met with failure.
The NLRB was a much weaker institution, which no longer enjoyed the support of the
Courts.  No longer liberalism’s workshop, the NLRB was unable to defend the law and
adapt it to a changing economic environment. All that was left of the Wagner Act was its
“economic reading,” a  weak base that  evaporated in the 70s with the advent of  neo
conservative  economics.  Thus  in  the  1960s,  liberals  still  believed  in  an  institutional
arrangement that was actually obsolete. In that sense, the rights revolution of the 1960s,
which might have afforded the possibility of recasting the law in more philosophical
terms, was a missed opportunity instead.
30 This leads me to Lichtenstein’s call for the creation of a “civil right to organize.” I agree
that in the American context, deploying a rights discourse is probably the only venue to
revive unionism. Yet, faced with a constitution that in the words of Justice O’Connor,
“protects persons, not groups,” the task of shaping a meaningful right to organize from
the Bill of Rights will be difficult.30 Roe v. Wade—the court decision protecting the right to
abortion—shows that interpreting the Bill of Rights in light of modern needs can be done,
even if that means enforcing a right not specifically spelled out in the Constitution.31 The
subsequent qualification of that right, however, should remind us that no right is really
meaningful unless it is predicated on a strong social contract. This is precisely what the
NLRB lacked in the 1940s, and what the EEOC and the Supreme Court lacked in the 1970s
and 80s to develop affirmative action programs. Unfortunately, none is in the offing right
now. If liberals fail to build this social contract, even the enactment of a civil right to
organize will ring like a hollow hope.32
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